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Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) developed as a normative pluralism resulting in the 
formation and diffusion of several schools of law in the principal centres of Islam. The 
schools of law (madhhab pl. madhāhib,)—in particular the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and 
Ḥanbalī, which are the main Sunnī schools that developed in the Islamic empire— 
reached their classical form only in the fourth/tenth century, with several features such as 
a common doctrine, institutionalized teaching, and authoritative leaders for each 
individual school.
1
 This was the result of a long process that began in Iraq under the early 
ʿAbbāsids, between the late second/eighth and the early third/ninth century, when the 
eponyms of these schools lived and taught. The first ʿAbbāsid caliphs played a 
considerable role in the promotion of several of these schools of law, as Nurit Tsafrir has 
shown in respect to the spread of the Ḥanafī madhhab.2 
According to Joseph Schacht, the development of the classical schools of law 
resulted in the transformation from ‘regional’ into ‘personal’ schools of law. The ancient 
Iraqi school, which united around a common ‘living tradition’, evolved in the third/ninth 
century into a new school associated with the authority of Abū Ḥanīfa and his most 
important students, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī.3 This shift corresponded to a 
globalization of legal thought, in which law was no longer anchored within one specific 
province of the caliphate. This theory has been recently challenged by Nimrod Hurvitz 
and Wael Hallaq, who refute the reality of any ‘regional’ school of law. They doubt that a 
common doctrine existed before the establishment of the classical schools of law (which 
they prefer to call ‘doctrinal schools’ rather than ‘personal’), and they believe that no 
early legal doctrine had any potency beyond the small circle of students around a 
particular master.
4
 
The latter theory, which is accurate from a purely legal point of view, does not take 
into account the subjective feelings of the people. I believe that the historian should pay 
more attention to how people who had a common way of life and a common way of 
thinking represented themselves when it came to legal matters. I will look specifically at 
what happened in certain cities in the early Islamic empire. Was there any sort of legal 
identity
5
 evident between one place and another? To answer this question, we have to 
leave the above-mentioned theories and focus on the connection between the local urban 
elites and the government. I will seek to investigate the role that the urban elite in several 
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Iraqi cities—and, to a lesser extent, in Fustat—played in selecting and appointing the 
qāḍīs during the early ʿAbbāsid period (132–218/750–833). I shall draw principally on 
the two sources for the history of the judiciary at that time: the Akhbār al-quḍāt of Wakīʿ 
(d. 306/918), a biographical dictionary of qāḍīs (mostly in Iraq), and the Akhbār quḍāt 
Miṣr of al-Kindī (d. 350/961), which focuses on Egyptian judges. Before discussing the 
essential issues, it is necessary to mention briefly certain legal problems in the middle of 
the second/eighth century, and to examine who the qāḍīs were and how they were 
appointed. 
 
 
1. Unity and Diversity: Legal Issues under the Late Umayyads and Early 
ʿAbbāsids 
 
The legal situation in Iraq in the middle of the second/eighth century appears 
clearly in one of the rare contemporary Arabic sources, the Risāla fī al-ṣaḥāba by the 
chancellery secretary Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. c. 140/757).6 In this famous epistle, the author 
warns the caliph al-Manṣūr (r. 136–58/754–75) about the legal diversity that is dividing 
the Islamic realm, including the province of Iraq itself. He cites as examples the cities of 
Ḥīra and Kufa, which, although situated near each other, applied different rules for 
similar crimes or offences. In fact, contradictory judgments could even be given in 
different parts of the same city.
7
 
The contradictions emphasized by Ibn al-Muqaffāʿ are a reflection of a wider 
phenomenon on which Schacht based his theory of the ancient schools of law. In the 
middle of the second/eighth century, three principal regional schools of law divided the 
Islamic Middle East: there was an Iraqi school, based on the jurists of Kufa and Basra; a 
Ḥijāzī school, based on the jurists of Medina and Mecca; and a Syrian school.8 These 
three schools represented divergent legal movements and proposed different solutions for 
the same problem. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s Risāla fī al-ṣaḥāba also shows that there were 
divisions within these regional schools. As Hallaq and Hurvitz suggested, it is probable 
that each circle of jurists had its own doctrines (as, for example, in Kufa, which was 
divided into several distinct schools of thought associated with particular parts of the 
city); nevertheless, it is also probable that, at a certain level, the people were aware of 
some kind of local ‘super-schools’, each one corresponding to a specific city. It is 
enough, for the time being, to emphasize the considerable legal diversity at that time, 
whether in Iraq or in Arabia (Medinese legal thought probably differed slightly from the 
Meccan).
9
 
After the revolution that toppled the Umayyads in 132/750, the ʿAbbāsid caliphs 
had to deal with this legal diversity. To overthrow the previous dynasty, the ʿAbbāsids 
had relied on a broad political movement of Shīʿī inspiration that supported the family of 
the Prophet. Once in power, the elected member of the family (al-riḍā min āl 
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Muḥammad) was supposed to restore justice and apply divine law.10 It is probable that 
some sort of legal reform was expected from the new dynasty and that Ibn al-Muqaffāʿ’s 
epistle reflected these popular expectations. The multiplicity of rules for just one crime 
(even major ones such as murder or illegal sexual intercourse) suggested that some of 
them, at least, did not comply with divine law. The unification of the law could therefore 
be seen as a major way to restore justice. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ proposed to al-Manṣūr a 
remedy for this legal diversity: the codification of Islamic law. The caliph would 
promulgate a unique legal code and would impose it on all the qāḍīs of the empire. This 
code would be updated by each subsequent caliph.
11
 According to later Muslim sources, 
al-Manṣūr asked the Medinese jurist Mālik ibn Anas (the eponym of the Mālikī school, d. 
179/795) to write such a code, but Mālik refused.12 Benjamin Jokisch argues that 
codification was eventually enforced under Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 170–193/786–809).13 I 
will come back to this later. All in all, it seems that a legal unification was difficult to 
enforce, because the elaboration of law was already regarded, in the main cities of the 
empire, as the prerogative of private scholars. 
 
 
2. The Judiciary in the Middle of the Second/Eighth Century 
 
2.1. A local institution 
During the late Umayyad and the early ʿAbbāsid periods, a single qāḍī was 
appointed in every large city, whose duties were both legal and administrative. From the 
early Umayyad period, if not earlier, his main task was to dispense justice between 
litigants who had filed complaints before him, most often in the city’s great mosque.14 
From the early ʿAbbāsids onwards, the qāḍī became a major administrator of the city and 
was sometimes expected to intervene in private business, when people could no longer 
manage their own affairs. In Egypt, as Sobhi Bouderbala has shown, the tribal 
administrators known as ʿarīfs managed the property of orphans under the Umayyads, but 
this authority was transferred to the qāḍī under al-Manṣūr.15 At the same time, the qāḍī of 
Basra began to manage the pious foundations (waqfs), the orphans’ properties, and the 
inheritance of people dying without an heir (ḥashriyyāt).16 These administrative tasks 
were subsequently upheld by legal theory.
17
 
The origins of the rules applied by the qāḍīs are still little known. Judges apparently 
relied on the Qurʾan and on normative practices (sunan) of exemplary men (including 
caliphs), and they contributed importantly to the drawing up of legal norms by the use of 
their personal opinion or raʾy.18 There was no definitive or binding written legal corpus 
yet. As far as we can trace them, the first ‘fixed’ compendia of jurisprudence emerged in 
the late second/eighth and the early third/ninth century, with the formation of the proto-
Ḥanafī and proto-Mālikī madhhabs.19 Despite their adherence to legal trends, qāḍīs could 
still choose the most appropriate legal solution to a specific issue,
20
 and it was not until 
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the late third/ninth or the early fourth/tenth century, with the formation of formal schools 
of law, that qāḍīs had to comply with the legal rules promoted by their own madhhab. 
The qāḍīs did not enjoy total freedom, because their rulings could be controlled by the 
government, which could easily dismiss them from their position.
21
 Nevertheless, they 
could, in many cases, apply their personal understanding of legal and social order, and 
they played a leading part in the shaping of an ‘Islamic’ society. Two qāḍīs from the 
middle of the second/eighth century exemplify this ambiguous role: the famous jurist Ibn 
Abī Laylā (d. in office, in 148/765), who served as a judge in Kufa at the end of the 
Umayyad period and under the first ʿAbbāsid caliphs,22 is well known for his contribution 
to the formulation of judiciary procedures based on his opinions and experience.
23
 In 
Basra, the qāḍī ʿUbayd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī (d. 168/785) contributed to the 
definition of the fiscal status of the regions near his city and refused to act on the legal 
and fiscal instructions of the caliph al-Mahdī (r. 158–69/775–85).24 
Judgeship was a key institution for the people of a city. The resolution of many 
problems depended on the qāḍī—on his legal opinions and on his judgements. From the 
middle of the second/eighth century onwards, state administrators and scholars began to 
work out theories about the ‘good’ qāḍī—his qualities and his knowledge. Later 
reflections, within the classical schools of law, unsurprisingly attached importance to the 
judge’s legal knowledge. In the second/eighth century, however, thinkers such as the 
chancellery secretary (kātib) ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn Yaḥyā (d. 132/750) or the qāḍī ʿUbayd 
Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī focused mainly on the social knowledge and experience of 
the judge: even though a legal background was required, such knowledge could be 
provided by counsellors whose advice the judge was supposed to seek. A lack of social 
knowledge, however, could not be counterbalanced: the qāḍī had to understand the urban 
society in which he was appointed, and figure out the complex familial and tribal 
relationships, such as, for example, in sharing out an inheritance between the legal 
beneficiaries.
25
 
Despite many common features, the inhabitants of every large city developed their 
own original characteristics following the Islamic conquests. Although Basra and Kufa 
were founded at the same time and in the same region, different tribes had settled there, 
and they had developed their own urban models. The Yamanī tribes of Kufa, for 
example, maintained their ancient tradition of gathering in cemeteries, which resulted in 
urban structures unknown in Basra.
26
 Each city had its own needs, and at the end of the 
Umayyad period, the judiciary was still seen as a local institution. This was possible 
largely because of the decentralized organization of the state. 
Until the reign of al-Manṣūr, the second ʿAbbāsid caliph, the qāḍīs were usually 
appointed by the governors of the cities or provinces. The caliph rarely intervened in their 
appointments. The qāḍī appeared as a kind of ‘legal secretary’ of the governor, who was 
considered to be the actual holder of the judgeship, and delegated his judicial powers to 
the qāḍī.27 The turnover of the governors was high, however, and most of them were sent 
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by the caliphate from outside the province or the city.
28
 Therefore, the governor often 
relied on the advice of the local elite when appointing a qāḍī. If a qāḍī died or was 
dismissed, he consulted the notables to learn whom they wanted as a replacement. This 
system was still apparent in the early ʿAbbāsid period, under al-Saffāḥ and at the 
beginning of the reign of al-Manṣūr. 29 
Not only were the notables involved in the selection of the qāḍī, but the qāḍī was 
also generally chosen from amongst the local elite itself. In Umayyad Iraq, the judges 
were local scholars supported by notables. In Fustat, all qāḍīs belonged to the leading 
Yamanī clans of the city, such as Ḥaḍramawṭ, Khawlān, and Sakūn.30 The judiciary was 
regarded as a local institution employing local inhabitants, and this local framework may 
well have contributed to a local or regional development of Islamic law. 
 
2.2. ʿAbbāsid centralization 
Almost two decades after the ʿAbbāsid revolution, the caliph initiated one of the 
most significant reforms of the dynasty, namely, the centralization of the state and 
judiciary. Al-Manṣūr and his successors decided that virtually all the judges in the empire 
should be appointed by the central government (the caliph, sometimes his chief judge, 
and later his vizier).
31
 The first appointment by al-Manṣūr took place in Basra in 
140/757,
32
 and twenty years later all the qāḍīs of the central provinces of the empire 
(including Fustat, Damascus and Medina) were appointed by the caliphate.
33
 The qāḍī 
was now dispensing justice in the name of the caliph. If we remember that the ʿAbbāsid 
revolution intended to restore justice on earth, after the allegedly illegitimate Umayyad 
dynasty, and that the first ʿAbbāsid caliphs claimed to be rightly guided rulers and 
deputies of God,
34
 we realize that this reform was symbolically significant. Moreover, it 
helped the caliphs increase their power by restricting that of the provincial governors. 
The latter were no longer responsible for carrying out justice and were therefore 
significantly weakened. They had lost the privileged relationship they had had with local 
scholars and had to deal with qāḍīs who were now their equals—both now being 
appointed directly by the caliph—and whose administrative responsibilities in each city 
were increasing. 
The centralization of the judiciary can also be interpreted as an attempt to unify 
legal practices and to reduce the heterogeneity denounced by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. If the 
caliphs could hardly codify Islamic law, which was already in the hands of private 
scholars, the centralization allowed them to select the qāḍīs and support one particular 
legal trend or another. As Nurit Tsafrir has shown,
35
 this was probably one of the main 
reasons for the centralization, and ʿAbbāsid legal policy is evident in the appointments of 
the qāḍīs in the capital, al-Hāshimiyya and later Baghdad. 
During the 25 years that followed the ʿAbbāsid revolution, the caliphs favoured 
mainly the Medinese school of law: they chose their qāḍīs from amongst the scholars of 
Medina and persuaded them to come to Iraq.
36
 Why did they choose to rely on this legal 
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trend? The sources are unfortunately silent about their motivation, but the following 
hypothesis can be made. The first ʿAbbāsid caliphs (al-Saffāḥ and al-Manṣūr) came from 
Syria, while their armies came from Khurāsān (an eastern province of Iran). When the 
new dynasty settled in Iraq, the political elite was not accustomed to Iraqi legal thought 
(founded on the practices and the traditions of the Companions and Successors who had 
settled in the main cities of southern Iraq),
37
 nor did they know the leading local scholars. 
According to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, Iraqi scholars had suffered from a poor reputation under 
the Umayyads, and the new power may have been hesitant to integrate them fully into 
their administration.
38
 Moreover, many Iraqi scholars (especially the traditionists) were 
pro-ʿAlid and regarded the ʿAbbāsids as usurpers. The first ʿAbbāsid caliphs may 
therefore have been reluctant to employ them.
39
 They could not rely on Syrian jurists 
such as al-Awzāʿī40 without giving the impression that they were following Umayyad 
practices, thereby losing the support of the Khurāsānī army. They therefore had to find a 
legal tradition that would seem to comply with divine will. For many people, Medina 
probably appeared as the preserve of the sunna (tradition) inherited directly from the 
Prophet. The scholars of this city saw themselves as the heirs of the true practice (ʿamal) 
of the Prophet, unbroken in Medina since the time he preached there.
41
 The caliphs may 
have hoped that these Medinese scholars would confer a wider legitimacy on the new 
dynasty, which would appear to be working for the restoration of the sunna of the 
Prophet. 
From the reign of al-Mahdī (the third ʿAbbāsid caliph, r. 158–69/775–85) onwards, 
the qāḍīs of Baghdad were drawn mainly from amongst Iraqi scholars, especially from 
the followers of the Kufan jurist Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767),42 as was the case with Abū 
Yūsuf (d. 182/798), the first qāḍī to be given the title of ‘chief qāḍī’ (qāḍī al-quḍāt). 
According to Nurit Tsafrir, the main reason for this change of legal policy was 
theological. Like Abū Ḥanīfa, most of his students were apparently Murjiʾīs who believed 
that the status of a sinner was postponed until the Day of Resurrection. Therefore, they 
refused to question the ruler and were considered to be particularly loyal to the ʿAbbāsid 
dynasty.
43
 
This interpretation does not, however, take into consideration the fact that early 
Murjiʾism was a more revolutionary movement than it became in the third/ninth 
century,
44
 and that Abū Ḥanīfa’s attitude toward the ʿAbbāsids was ambiguous.45 Other 
reasons—probably legal—might explain the ʿAbbāsids’ support of proto-Ḥanafīs, and 
this issue needs further research that is beyond the scope of this chapter. Be that as it 
may, the ʿAbbāsids quickly extended their policy beyond Baghdad by the means of 
centralization and appointed members of Abū Ḥanīfa’s circle as qāḍīs in other cities of 
Iraq and the Middle East, thus promoting what would eventually become the Ḥanafī 
school of law.
46
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3. The Resistance of Local Elites to ʿAbbāsid Centralization 
 
3.1. An ʿAbbāsid absolutism? 
In spite of the centralization ordered by the ʿAbbāsid caliphs, the judiciary did not 
immediately lose its local characteristics, nor did urban elites forget their interest in the 
appointment of qāḍīs. This can be seen clearly in the city of Basra, where a new judge 
was appointed in 156/773. Wakīʿ relates the following story: 
 
ʿUbayd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan al-Muʾaddib reported from al-Numayrī, from ʿAbd 
al-Wāḥid ibn Ghiyāth, from Jannāb al-Khashkhāsh, from Sallām ibn Abī Khayra: 
After Sawwār’s death,47 we talked about him at ʿUbayd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan’s,48 
who implored God in his favour and praised him. We asked ʿUbayd Allāh: 
‘Who do you think would be suitable for the judgeship after him?’ 
‘That is obvious’, he replied. ‘Abū Bakr ibn al-Faḍl al-ʿAtakī’. 
Then we visited Abū Bakr and talked about Sawwār. He implored God in his 
favour and we asked him: 
‘Who do you think would be suitable for the judgeship after him?’ 
‘Is there any doubt about that?’ he replied. ‘It can only be one man: ʿUbayd 
Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan’. 
Sallām ibn Abī Khayra said: 
We were surprised by their common agreement on the matter. 
 
Even though this narrative is told to highlight the importance of these two scholars 
(ʿUbayd Allāh ibn al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī and Abū Bakr ibn al-Faḍl al-ʿAtakī) and their 
modesty, it may also show how discussions took place in the selection of new qāḍīs. In 
this story, the scholars do not suggest the candidate most likely to be selected by the 
caliph, but rather express their opinion on who deserved to become a qāḍī. 
How did they dare speak out about this matter, when judges were now appointed by 
the central authority according to a wide political programme that promoted the 
standardization of legal practice? Some scholars believe that this programme was the 
result of an autocratic system, in which the arbitrary power of the caliph was absolute.
49
 
But centralization did not mean despotism, as Nurit Tsafrir has clearly shown.
50
 The 
legitimacy of the ʿAbbāsid dynasty was not well enough established to allow the caliphs 
to impose their legal and judicial policy by force. They could easily experiment with a 
new legal policy in Baghdad because it was a new city, built almost ex nihilo and without 
any local legal tradition.
51
 But the situation was totally different in other Iraqi cities: the 
so-called ʿAbbāsid ‘revolution’ was regarded by many people as a usurpation of power, 
either at the expense of the Umayyads (according to the majority of Syrians)
52
 or of the 
ʿAlid family. The crystallization of the Shīʿī opposition around ʿAlid leaders such as the 
Ḥasanid Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbd Allāh (d. 145/763), who revolted in Basra under al-Manṣūr,53 
jeopardized the caliphate in Iraq. The ʿAbbāsids could not afford to impose any legal 
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reform against the wishes of the local elites, lest opposition to their dynasty be 
strengthened. 
 
3.2. Dealing with local issues 
The centralization of the judiciary was a long process, and the method of selecting 
the qāḍīs did not change immediately. The first ʿAbbāsid caliphs still consulted local 
people before appointing a judge and summoned to Baghdad delegations (wafd, pl. 
wufūd) made up of notables. The sources give several examples of delegations coming 
from Basra to meet the caliphs al-Mahdī and al-Rashīd (r. 170–93/786–809). These 
delegations usually consisted of five or six notables and scholars from the city, 
representing different legal and theological trends.
54
 The caliph received them and asked 
whom they wanted as qāḍī. In 167/783–4, the governor of Basra, Muḥammad ibn 
Sulaymān, chose a delegation of six local notables and sent them to the caliph al-Mahdī. 
The governor wanted them to insist that the caliph dismiss Khālid ibn Ṭalīq, a qāḍī who 
was apparently hated by many Basrans. Although the delegation was used as a tool by the 
governor to obtain the dismissal of Khālid ibn Ṭalīq, each member felt free to propose his 
own candidate to replace the dismissed judge, and it seems that the local elite could make 
themselves heard. Moreover, according to the list reported by Wakīʿ, the members of this 
delegation were representatives of rival groups in Basra, such as partisans of raʾy, 
partisans of ḥadīth, proto-Ḥanafīs, members of the Basran legal trend, and Muʿtazilīs.55 
Although the delegation consisted of only six men, they represented a large section of the 
Basran elite. Such consultations of the local elite did not mean that the ʿAbbāsids 
renounced their programme of legal unification in favour of the proto-Ḥanafī trend, but it 
did mean that the enforcement of this programme was limited by local wishes 
56
. 
The consultation of the provincial elite had perhaps a symbolic meaning: the caliph 
had to show that he was not a tyrant. As a deputy of God, however, he could claim to 
have a better understanding of legal issues and to have the right to appoint whomever he 
wanted as qāḍī. The issue was therefore not merely symbolic. The caliph was ready to 
take the delegations’ opinion into consideration, which means that the local wishes were 
seen as important. The city’s notables insisted particularly on having a ‘local’ qāḍī. Émile 
Tyan has interpreted this request as a matter of ‘national pride’.57 Evidence shows that 
the reality was more complex. It seems that an ability to understand local practices was a 
key criterion in the selection of qāḍīs, a criterion that could be verified only by people 
who were familiar with local practices. 
Two examples from Iraq can be cited to illustrate this hypothesis. Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd 
al-Anṣārī (d. 143/760?), a Ḥijāzī jurist who had been a judge in Medina under the 
Umayyad caliph al-Walīd II (r. 125–6/743–4)58, was appointed qāḍī of al-Hāshimiyya by 
al-Saffāḥ or al-Manṣūr.59 Just before leaving Medina for Iraq, Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd prided 
himself on ‘knowing everything’ in the presence of Sulaymān ibn Bilāl al-Qurashī (d. c. 
172/788–9), a Medinese scholar who had been in charge of land tax in his city. 60 Later, 
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however, Sulaymān ibn Bilāl received a letter in which Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd complained that 
he could not understand some of the litigations brought before him in court and that, in 
such cases, he did not know which judgement to pass. He requested the secret assistance 
of another Medinese jurist, Rabīʿa al-Raʾy (d. 136/753).61 Although Wakīʿ is silent about 
the nature of these problematic cases, we can suppose that Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd’s Medinese 
legal training was inapplicable to many aspects of Iraqi society. 
The second example is from about 145/762, when the Egyptian jurist and qāḍī 
Ghawth ibn Sulaymān (d. 168/785) went to Iraq and was asked by the caliph al-Manṣūr 
to arbitrate on a matrimonial conflict between him and his wife, Umm Mūsā. 
Subsequently, the caliph proposed to appoint him qāḍī of Kufa. Ghawth ibn Sulaymān 
protested that he was not from that city (balad) and that he knew nothing about its 
inhabitants. According to al-Kindī, Ghawth was appointed qāḍī of Kufa, but after a while 
people stopped attending his court, and he was dismissed.
62
 According to Ibn ʿAsākir, 
however, al-Manṣūr accepted his excuse of not being familiar with the city and never 
appointed him to Kufa; this is probably closer to the truth, because Ghawth ibn Sulaymān 
does not appear in Wakīʿ’s list of Kufan judges.63 The first ʿAbbāsid caliphs supported, to 
a certain extent, the ancient Egyptian school of law, and several leading Egyptian 
scholars were attracted to Baghdad.
64
 However, even though al-Manṣūr appealed to an 
Egyptian jurist to arbitrate his personal litigations, he could hardly appoint such a 
‘stranger’ as a qāḍī to a major Iraqi city. If he actually did, as al-Kindī maintains, the 
appointment failed, because the Kufans would not accept a judge who could not 
understand the particularities of their society. 
 
3.3. A question of legal doctrine: central authority versus local interests 
In several instances, the delegations sent to the caliph opposed the promotion of 
proto-Ḥanafī qāḍīs, not only because they were ‘strangers’ unable to understand local 
cases, but also because of their legal doctrine. The notables were attached to their local 
traditions and were not ready to accept a qāḍī belonging to a different legal trend. Some 
feared that such a judge would seriously disrupt the urban order and harm the people’s 
material interests. When the caliph al-Mahdī consulted the delegation of Basrans in 
167/783–4, one of them suggested the appointment of a local scholar, Muḥammad ibn 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Anṣārī (d. 215/830),65 and praised him for his qualities, but another 
member of the delegation contradicted him, saying: 
 
‘He spoke truly, and indeed he has all these qualities. However, this advice is 
not wise, because this man follows Abū Ḥanīfa and inclines towards his opinions 
(raʾyu-hu). Yet, we have in our city rules (aḥkām) that Abū Ḥanīfa considers 
invalid, but which are the only ones suitable for us. If he judged our litigations on 
the ground of rules other than our own, our rules would become void, and our 
goods would be lost’—he seemed to be alluding to the pious foundations.66 
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It was eventually another scholar, faithful to the Basran legal tradition, who was 
appointed by the caliph. This story shows that at the end of the eighth century CE, the 
representatives of the Basran people regarded the doctrine of the Kufan Abū Ḥanīfa as a 
foreign one.
67
 Despite divergences between local circles of jurists, they were all more or 
less united around a local common practice, especially regarding the administration of 
pious foundations. Abū Ḥanīfa contested the validity of permanent pious foundations 
established for relatives (waqf ahlī), which could be used to evade Islamic law on 
inheritance. According to him, a waqf was valid only if the founder established it as from 
the moment of his death;
68
 moreover, only the descendants of the founder who had 
already been procreated by the time the founder died were entitled to a share in the 
revenues of the foundation. When these descendants died, their shares had to be 
transferred to indigent people, so that no more than two or three generations could benefit 
from the revenue of a pious foundation.
69
 If such family foundations were a traditional 
practice in Basra, the prosperity and wealth of many Basrans would have been threatened 
by a proto-Ḥanafī qāḍī.70 
The elite of Fustat also rejected a proto-Ḥanafī qāḍī coming from Iraq, Ismāʿīl ibn 
Alīsaʿ (164–7/781–4). He wanted to apply the same rule in Egypt and was accused of 
trying to abrogate the pious foundations.
71
 In addition, the people of Fustat reproached 
him for tolerating the insult yā maʾbūn, yā lūṭī (an accusation of passive homosexuality), 
which he did not consider punishable by the prescribed sanction (ḥadd) for false 
accusation of fornication (qadhf).
72
 Once more, he followed the teaching of Abū Ḥanīfa, 
who did not regard such an insult as a crime as long as it was vague enough, whereas 
Mālik ibn Anas assimilated it to qadhf and ordered the culprit to be punished harshly.73 
Like their principal jurist, al-Layth ibn Saʿd (d. 175/791), the inhabitants of Fustat were 
strongly opposed to homosexual behaviour and thus to false accusations of homosexual 
behaviour.
74
 The Ḥanafī doctrine might have been seen to jeopardize public morality in 
Fustat. 
In Egypt, as in the Iraqi amṣār (military settlements), the Ḥanafī doctrine promoted 
by the central government was not easily accepted. Until the reign of al-Rashīd, at the 
end of the second/eighth century, the Basran people prevented the caliph from appointing 
any qāḍī from amongst the followers of Abū Ḥanīfa and demanded that scholars be 
recruited from within the local legal tradition.
75
 Even in Kufa, where the students of Abū 
Ḥanīfa were only one of the prominent circles of jurists, the government could not 
appoint scholars who can be safely identified as proto-Ḥanafīs until the reign of al-Amīn 
(r. 193–8/809–13). The judiciary remained in the hands of the followers of Ibn Abī Laylā, 
Abū Ḥanīfa’s main rival.76 
The wishes of notables were thus the principal obstacle to the ʿAbbāsid policy. 
Several times, the caliph appointed a qāḍī in Basra against the wishes of the inhabitants, 
but usually such a qāḍī stayed in office for no more than one or two years, whereas qāḍīs 
appointed in accordance with the wishes of the people stayed in office for an average of 
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five or six years.
77
 The most striking example is that of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad 
al-Makhzūmī, a Ḥanafī qāḍī appointed in Basra in 172/788–9 against the wishes of the 
people: he was dismissed just four months later.
78
 Wakīʿ explains that he could not 
resolve the litigations brought before him and that he hesitated before issuing a judgment 
diverging from local legal traditions: 
 
Al-Aḥwaṣ ibn al-Mufaḍḍal ibn Ghassān reported from Ḥafṣ ibn ʿUthmān: 
We saw a woman who had submitted a case before ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn 
Muḥammad al-Makhzūmī, the qāḍī of Basra. When she became impatient to hear 
his judgment, he stood before her and said: ‘I have difficulties with your case, even 
though I know what is right and not wrong according to my [own doctrine]. Be 
patient. If you want me to talk to the governor, so that he convenes the jurists of 
Basra for you, I can do that. And if you want, I shall write to the Commander of the 
Faithful and ask the jurists of the Muslims who sit next to him’.79 
 
The qāḍī could not issue a judgement in conformity with local practices, perhaps 
because he did not understand these practices—or because he simply would not depart 
from his beliefs. On the other hand, he could not impose his own doctrine and bring upon 
himself the litigants’ wrath. He therefore left the decision to the assembly of local 
scholars or to the jurists of the caliph’s court (presumably Ḥanafīs like himself). 
 
3.4. Towards a marginalisation of ancient provincial elites 
The centralization of the judiciary had long-term consequences for the provincial 
elite. Despite the role that the first ʿAbbāsid caliphs still accorded to local notables in the 
selection of qāḍīs, the reform initiated by al-Manṣūr can also be interpreted as an attempt 
to undermine their power. This attempt was eventually successful, as shown by the 
history of Egyptian qāḍīs. 
The first qāḍī appointed by al-Manṣūr in Fustat, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Lahīʿa (d. 
174/790), was still a representative of the old class of Egyptian notables (wujūh) who 
controlled the key institutions in Fustat, such as the position of ṣāḥib al-shurṭa (chief of 
the police).
80
 A few years later, however, the caliph al-Mahdī appointed, for the first time 
in the history of Egypt, a qāḍī who did not belong to the local elite, but came from Iraq 
(Ismāʿīl ibn Alīsaʿ, who was also a follower of Abū Ḥanīfa).81 He was so unpopular that 
the caliph had no choice but to dismiss him and replace him with an Egyptian scholar 
(Ghawth ibn Sulaymān, and then al-Mufaḍḍal ibn Faḍāla). In 170/786, the caliph al-Hādī 
(r. 169–70/785–6) appointed a new ‘outsider’ in Fustat, the Medinese ʿAbd al-Malik ibn 
Muḥammad al-Ḥazmī, followed a few years later by the Iraqi Muḥammad ibn Masrūq. At 
first, the caliphs sent qāḍīs from Yamanī tribes, because they probably believed that they 
would be more accepted in a predominantly Yamanī environment.82 Hārūn al-Rashīd 
soon abandoned this precaution and appointed Qaysī qāḍīs such as al-ʿUmarī and al-
Bakrī. 
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The centralization of the Egyptian judiciary has been interpreted as part of a wider 
programme of legal unification under the (proto-)Ḥanafī trend.83 Not all the qāḍīs sent 
from Iraq were Ḥanafīs, however. Al-Ḥazmī belonged to the Medinese/proto-Mālikī 
school, as did al-ʿUmarī and, later, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Zuhrī (217–26/832–
40).
84
 In Egypt, at least, the centralization of the judiciary meant first and foremost a 
reinforcement of caliphal authority. The caliphs tried, as far as possible, to send qāḍīs 
belonging to the madhhab that they personally supported, which was not always the 
Ḥanafī school. Al-Rashīd probably sent al-ʿUmarī to Fustat when he turned to the 
Mālikīs, after the death of Abū Yūsuf, and appointed the Medinese Abū al-Bakhtarī as 
chief qāḍī.85 
The fourth fitna (the war between al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn and its aftermath) 
temporarily defeated the efforts of the caliphate to enhance its authority. Between 
197/813 and 211/826, Egypt became virtually autonomous.
86
 The wujūh were able to 
regain control of Fustat, and qāḍīs were appointed from within the old established 
families who had long monopolized the institution, but this reversal of affairs was short 
lived. In 211/826, the governor ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ṭāhir re-established ʿAbbāsid authority in 
Egypt, and the traditional Yamanī wujūh disappeared from the political scene forever.87 A 
new ruling elite came to power. Most of the qāḍīs were now outsiders and belonged to 
Qaysī tribes. Even though Muḥammad ibn Abī l-Layth (226–35/841–50) had lived in 
Fustat for twenty years when he was appointed qāḍī,88 he was a Ḥanafī from a Qaysī tribe 
and, as the principal participant of the miḥna 1 in Fustat in the 840s,89 he represented—
more than anyone—the coercive power of the central government.90 
In Iraq, the influence of the local elites was still evident at the beginning of the 
third/ninth century. The number of Ḥanafī qāḍīs increased in Basra and Kufa during the 
following decades. This does not mean that a central power was imposed on a reluctant 
people. The proto-Ḥanafī school had supposedly gained ground in these two cities, and 
the caliphate could more easily appoint qāḍīs belonging to this school of law.91 
Nevertheless, the influence of the local elite soon declined. As was the case in Egypt, the 
provincial elite of Kufa and Basra no longer played a part in the selection of their qāḍīs, 
and we do not hear about any delegation after the return of al-Maʾmūn (r. 198–218/813–
33) to Baghdad in 204/819. Individual scholars were consulted before the appointment of 
a qāḍī under al-Mutawakkil (r. 232–47/847–61), but they were no longer representatives 
of the local peoples.
92
 Between the fourth fitna and the second half of the third/ninth 
century, most of the qāḍīs in Kufa were still drawn from local scholars, but they no 
longer belonged to the dominant Yamanī clans (such as Nakhaʿ) from within which 
judges had usually been selected in the second/eighth century.
93
 The spread of doctrinal 
schools of law caused a standardization of knowledge that was soon reinforced by a 
‘traditionalization’ of law in which a ‘universal’ Muḥammad replaced the local 
                                                 
1
 The miḥna is the ‘inquisition’ that al-Maʾmūn organized to impose the dogma of the creation of the 
Qurʾan. 
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Companions as the source of legal practice. This doctrinal standardisation no longer left a 
place for local legal practices as they had existed. Thereafter, local practices could be 
recognized only insofar as they were assimilated into the main madhhabs.
94
 
 
Conclusion 
During the second half of the second/eighth century, appointments to the judiciary 
in Iraq and Egypt were the subject of strenuous competition between the local elite and 
the central government. Negotiations for the selection of appropriate candidates, which 
can be seen as evidence of the close collaboration between the local elite and the central 
government, do not conceal the issues at stake. The caliphate tried to increase its 
authority in the main provincial cities and reduce legal heterogeneity in the empire. The 
local learned elite resisted this policy in order to preserve its traditional power and local 
interests. 
At first, the ʿAbbāsids’ lack of legitimacy required some concessions, and the 
provincial elite succeeded in keeping some of its special prerogatives in the selection of 
qāḍīs until the end of the second/eighth century. The first ʿAbbāsid caliphs had to take 
into account the interests and particularities of the local situation: they could not afford to 
muzzle local wishes without renouncing their claim to restore justice. Benjamin Jokisch 
argues that Ḥanafī law was imposed by the central power on the Islamic empire by the 
means of judges.
95
 This theory is weakened by the fact that the central power and the 
local elite were at that time in a permanent negotiation. In the third/ninth century, 
however, the reinforcement of caliphal authority (particularly during the miḥna) and the 
evolution of political structures resulted in a definitive marginalisation of the local elite. 
In the long run, the ʿAbbāsids did not succeed by coercion but by negotiating with 
local communities and by supporting new legal trends. The promotion of Ḥanafism—
and, to a lesser extent, Mālikism—as well as job opportunities offered to those who had 
reached a high position in the Ḥanafī school, encouraged scholars to adhere to this 
school. They hoped that it would allow them to find a position as a judge, scribe, or 
professional witness. 
On the whole, the transition from the ‘ancient’ to the ‘personal’ (or ‘doctrinal’) 
schools of law can be seen as the tension between two forms of identity. At the local 
level, the Muslim people of the main cities defended their material and moral interests 
with their attachment to local customs, rooted in the traditions of the Companions and 
Successors. At the centre, the ʿAbbāsid state engaged in a programme of centralization 
and standardization that can be seen as an attempt to enhance an Islamic ‘universalism’. 
At the same time, the development of Prophetic ḥadīth—which eventually replaced, to a 
large extent, the older traditions of the Companions and of the Successors—appears as 
the most important factor in the development of a universal Islamic model, that of the 
Prophet Muhammad. Relationships between religious scholars and the state have often 
been seen as antagonistic, each side trying to assert its authority over the other. From 
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another point of view—that of a struggle between local practices and Islamic 
universalism—both the state and the scholars were moving toward the same end. In two 
distinct ways, they promoted a comprehensive identity over and above local traditions. 
The support of doctrinal schools of law contributed greatly to the reshaping of urban self-
definitions. Muslims identified more and more with this new universal concept of 
knowledge, and less and less with local trends of thought. 
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